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BLUMENTHAL t!. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS

[L. A. No. 26565.

In Bank.

[57 C.2d

Jan. 18, 1962.]

HERMAN BLUMENTHAL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v.
THE BOARD OF Jl.IEDICAL EXAMINERS, Defendant and Respondent.
[1] Physicians-Statute Regulating Practice of Optometry.-Bus.
& Prof. Code, § 255:2, subd. (a), relating to registered dispensing opticians, discriminates between persons who have
served the requisite five-year apprenticeship or who have been
licensed for five years in another state and other persons
regardless of their qualifications. To conflict with constitutional
provisions, however, the discrimination must be actually and
palpably unreasonable and arbitrary.
[2] Constitutional Law - Classification - Presumptions.-When a
legislative classification is questioned, if any state of facts
reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, there is
a presumption of existence of that state of facts, and the
burden of showing arbitrary action rests on the one who assails
the classification.
[3] ld.-Equal Protection of Laws.-So long as a statute does not
pennit one to exercise a privilege while refusing it to another
of like qualifications, under like conditions and circumstances,
it is unobjectionable.
[4] ld.-Classification-Relation to Object of Statute.-A discrimination that bears no reasonable relation to a proper legislative
objective is invalid.
[5] Physicians-Statute Regulating Practice of Optometry.-Bus.
& Prof. Code, § 2552, prescribing the requisites of an applicant
for registration as a dispensing optician, is designed to protect
the public from incompetent and unethical opticians, but there
is no reasonable difference between the classes established by
subd. (a) of that section that would justify the discrimination
imposed.
[1] Constitutionality of statutes and validity of regulations relating to optometry, notes, 98 A.L.R. 905; 22 A.L.R.2d 939. See
also Cal.Jur.2d, Physicians, Dentists and Other Healers of the
Sick, § 3.
[2J See Cal.Jur.2 d, Constitutional Law, § 277; Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, § 519.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 5-9, 14, 16] Physicians, § 4(3); [2]
Constitutional Law, § 163 j [3] Constitutional Law, § 138; [4, 13]
Constitutional Law, § 156 (4); [10, 11] Constitutional Law, § 85;
[1:2] Constitutional La~, § 84; [15] Constitutional Law, § 64; [17]
Physicians, § 16; [18] Criminal Law, § 1019; [19J Physicians, § 8.
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[6] ld.-Statute Regulating Practice of Optometry.-Abuses by
nnscmpulons physici:lns :1nd (1ispc n;<ing opticians, involving
referrals, reb a tes and other un ethical means of extracting
secret profits, justify <'orrecti\'e action by the Lcgishture,
hut it was not reasoll:1hle for the Legi~lature to concludc, by
cmcting Bus. & Prof. Code, § ~;)52, subd. (a), that future
dispensing opticialls could develop a proper et hical foundation
for their professional careers only by working und er the direction of licensed dispensing opticians; there was no r elationship between thc experience requirements sought to be imposed and the legislative effort to correct ethical abuses in the
profession.
[7] ld.-Statute Regulating Practice of Optometry.-That portion
of Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2552, subd. (a), requiring an applicant
for regi stration as a dispensing optician to have been licensed
as such in another state, but requiring no particular course
of training and imposing no standards for judging the licensing
of other states, is an arbitrary restriction.
[8] ld.-Statute Regulating Practice of Optometry.-The experience necessary to qualify a person to dispense optical goods,
whatever level of expertise is demanded, is obtainable in a
variety of ways, and Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2552, subd. (a), by
prescribing that such experience may be obtained in only two
ways, neither of which may reasonably be thought to be superior to others, contravenes the constitutioual requirement that
regulatory legislation avoid arbitrary and unre as onable classifications.
[9] ld.-Statute Regulating Practice of Optometry.-Bus. & Prof.
Code, § 2552, subd. (a), is invalid because it confers on pres·
ently licensed di spen sing' opticians the unl imited and unguided
power to exclude from tJ~ e ir profession any or all persons.
[10] Constitutional Law- Delegation of Power-To Administrative Body.-While the deleg:1tion of governmental authority
to an administrative body is prope r in some instanc e~, the
delegation of absolute leg islnti,e di scr eti on is not. To avoid
such a result it is necessa r y that a delegating statute estnblish
an ascertainable standard to g uide the administrative bod~' .
[11] ld. - Delegation of Power - To Administrative Body.-The
absence of ascertainable standa;'us or safeguards to guide an
administrati,e body in th e exel'ci;<e of ueJegated power renders
effective review of the (>xel'eise of such power impossible.
[12] ld.-Delegation of Power.-Dl'lega teu power must be accompanied by suitable 5afl';;na)'(1 5 to guide its use and to protect
against its misuse.
[10] See Cal.Jur.2d, Constitutiunal Law, § 134; Am.Jur ..
stitutional Law, § 238 et seq.
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[13] Id.-Classification-Relation to Object of Statute.-'WhCll a
statute discriminates between members or uilIcrent classcs,
and the discrimination has no reasonable relation to the
public health, safety and wel fare, it must fr.ll v;hethcr it involves the healing ar t s or any other activity.
[14] Physicians-St:l.tute Regul ating Practice of Optometry.-The
invalidity of Bus. & Prof. Code, § 255~, subd. (a), prescribing
the requisites of an applicant for registration as a dispensing
optician, does not arrect the provisions of subd. (b), which
requires applicants to present affidavits establishing experience, good moral character and competence. The L egislature
may require applicants for licenses as dispensing opticians to
demonstrate that they have these qualities.
[15] Constitutional Law - Partial Unconstitutionality-Separable
Provisions.-The test of severability of a statute is whether
the invalid parts of the statute can be severed from the otherwise valid parts without des:roying the statutory scheme or
the u tility of the re!"nainillg pro\· isions.
[16] Physicians-Statute Regulating Praetice of Optometry.-AIthough failure to conform to an unconstitutional regulation
might under some circumstances be evidence of bad character,
it was not so in the case of an applicant for registration as a
dispensing optician where he did not violate Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 2552, relating to dispen sing opticians, until denial of his
application for failure to satisfy the condition that rendered
the regulation invalid, and where the violations indicated no
continued intention to disregard the law but rather an effort to
establish its invalidity.
[17] Id.-Licenses.-An applicant for a license as dispensing
optician did not testify falsely regarding an instance of dispensing without a license "\I,here the record established that he
was, at most, confused as to the meaning of "dispensing"
under the statute. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2552.)
[18] Criminal Law-Judgment-Collateral Attack.-A conviction
for violation of an unconstitutional statute may be attacked
collaterally.
[19] Physicians-Licenses.-An applicant for a license as dispensing optician was entitled to be licensed as such optician
where he met the requirement of two years' experience in
optical dispensing, and where he furnished the requisite affidavits attesting to his good moral character.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Ellsworth Meyer, Judge. Reversed with directions.
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Proceeding in mandamus to compel the Board of Mcdical
Examiners to register an applicant as a dispensing optician.
Judgment denying writ, reversed with directions.
Ellis J. Horvitz for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, and Philip C. Griffin, Deputy Attorney General, for Defendant and Respondent.
Athearn, Chandler & Hoffman, Walter Hoffman, Clark W.
Maser, Richard Harrington, Wilke, Fleury & Sapunor and
Jack M. Sapunor as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and
Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Petitioner appeals from a judgment denying his petition for a writ of mandate to compel the Board of
Medical Examiners to register him as a dispensing optician.
Petitioner's first application for a license, filed on or about
March 5, 1957, was denied on April 18, 1957, because he had
not established that he had "at least five (5) full years of
actual experience in taking facial measurements and fitting
and adjusting lenses or frames in an establishment or establishments of a dispensing optician registered under this chapter or of a dispensing optician engaged in dispensing prior
to the enactment of this chapter and thereafter registered, or
who has been licensed as a dispensing optician for a period
of five years in another state. "1 (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2552,
subd. (a).) Petitioner's second application, filed on or about
May 21, 1957, was denied on October 17, 1958, on the same
ground. The board also found that petitioner had not met
the requirement of good moral character imposed by subdivision (b) of section 2552. The basis for this finding was that
petitioner had pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor charge of
'Petitioner contends that this section should be interpreted lUI permit·
ting issuance of licenses to applicants who establish that they have been
licensed in another state for a period of five years. This interpretation
was adopted by the Attorney General b efore the enactment in 1953 of
aaction 2553.1, which proviiled in detail for the issuance of licenses to
applicants who have had five years' e:xperience as licensed opticians in
another state. (16 Ops. Atty. Gen. 93, 94.) The board suggests that
aaction 2552, properly interpreted, does not permit issuance of licenses
to IlUch applicants, but does permit issuan ce of licenses to applicants who
demonstrate five years' experience in a dispensing establishment licensed
in California or in another state. Under either interpretation the statute
18 IlUbject to the objections made by petitioner, and it is therefore un·
~Wlary to decide which is correct.
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having dispensed optical goods without a license (Bus. & Prof.
Code, §§ 2550, 2558) on or about April 9, 1958. He was fined
and placed on probation. In September U)58 he disp ensed
optical goods again without a license and in violation of his
probation.
P etitioner completed high school and sp cut t\y O y ea rs at
the Uniycr sity of Southcrn California in IH'c0ptomctry . lI t'
worked for Commercial Optical Company in Omaha, Nebraska from 1930 to 1935. During this time he cn gaged ill
shop work (the manufacture of optical goods ) and in d ispcnsing (the fitting and adjusting of optical prouucts) . This
company was not licensed as a dispensing optician, for N ebraska uocs not require a license of disp ensing opticians.
From 1935 to 1942 petitioner worked for the Dietrich Optical Company in Los Angeles, which ,vas licensed as a di sp ensing optician. Although he did some dispensillg therc, it
appears that his primary occupation illvolved shop work.
From 1942 to 1949 h e worked for the Superior Optical Company in Los Angeles, where he was engaged exclusively in
shop work except for a six-month period during which he
did dispensing work for another registered dispensing optician.
From 1949 to 1952 petitioner operated his own optical
laboratory where he engaged solely in manufacturing. H e
dispensed the manufactured product only occasionally wh en
he went to a doctor's office to assist the dispensers therc. Fr o!~ l
1952 to 1957 he worked as a dispensing optician in the office
. of a r egist ered ophthalmologist in B eyer]y Hi lls.
In :March 1957 petitioner open ed his own di;: p 2nsill c:- ;11 \(1
manufacturing establishment in Beverly Hills and applied for
a license a<; a dispensing optician.
P etitioner admits that he do es not meet the experiencc
r equirement of subdivision (a) of section 2562 of the Bu s in e ~; :,
and Professions Code, but urges that this sub<1ivision i;; un constitutional on the ground that it imposes inequalities prohibited by the equal prot ection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the "United States COllstitntion and articl e T,
sections 11 and 21 of the Constitution of the State of California.
[1] Sedio!l 2:55:2, subdiyision (a) discriminates br t\\"rl' ll
persons who have serYed the requisitc five-year apprenticrship
or \\'ho han been li~ensecl for five years in another state an(l
other persons regardl ess of their qualifications. To eonfli c·t
with constitutional provisions, however, the discrimination
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"must be 'actually and palpably nnreasonable and arbitrary,'
or th e leg islative d ete rmination as to what is a su ffic ient distillction to '\'arrant the classification will not be overthrown.
[Ci tat ions. ] [2] When a legisla tive classification is q uest ioned, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that
would sustain it, ther e is a presumption of ('xistenee of that
state of facts, and the burd en of showing arbitrary action
rests upon the one who assails the classifi cation . [Citations.]"
(People v. Western Fruit G"ow ers, Inc., 22 Ca1.2d 494, 506507 [140 P.2d 13] ; Department of Men tal Hygien e v. McGilvery, 50 Ca1.2d 742,760 [329 P.2d 689].) [3] "So long
as the statute does not permit one to exercise the privilege
while refusing it to another of like qualifications, under like
conditions and circumstances, it is unobjectionable upon this
ground." ( Watson v. Division of Motor Vehicles, 212 Cal.
279, 284 [298 P . 481]. )
[4] .A discrimination, however, that bears no r easonable
relation to a proper legislative obj ective is invalid. Thus,
in Acc01l'nting Cor·p . v. State B oard of Accountancy, 34 Cal.
2d 186 [208 P .2d 984], we held unconstitutional legislation
that permitted corporations that had been engaged in the
practice of public accountancy for at least three years before
the effective date of the statute to continue in business, but
made unlawful such practice by all other corporations, because" a statute which p ermits some corporations to continue
operations as public accountants while denying others that
privilege where no reasonable grounds exist for such favoritism, denies equal protection to the excluded corporations and
grants unlawful privileges to the favored ." (P. 191.) In D el
.'lIar Cann in g Co . v. Payne, 29 Ca1.2d 380 [175 P.2d 231],
we struck down a regulation that permitted certain fish-reduction plants to obtain operating permits but denied permits
to others because the classification was "purely arbitrary and
capricious, resting on no reasonable or substantial difference
between the classes when considered in relation to the object
of the r egulation." (P. 383.)
[5] Section 2552 is d es igned to protect the public from
incompetent and unethical opticians. \Ve are unable, howewr,
to find any reasonable difference between the classes established by subdivision (a ) of that section that would justify
the discriminatiorl imposed.
[6] Proponents of section 2552, subdivision (a) contend
that it was reasonable for th e L egislature to impose the restrictive apprenticeship requirement because of conditions
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prevalcnt in th e industry. Th ey point to the long hi;; lory
of abuses, of which both unscrupulous physicians and (lispensing opticians have been guilty, im·olving' r ef(' rrals, rebates, and other unethical means of ext racting sccrct profits
from a helpless public. Certainly such condition,; j ust if.v
corrective action by the Legislature, and in 1939 chapter 5.5
of the Business and Professions Code (';;tabli sh pc1 a li cens inq
procedure for dispensing opticians and prohibited misleading advertising and other unethical practices. The 1947
amendment to section 2552 of the Business and Professions
Code requires applicants for licenses as dispensing opticians
to demonstrate good moral character. Section 650 of the
Business and Professions Code, enacted in 1949, prohibits unearned rebates, refunds and commissions as compensation for
referrals.
It is suggested that this history of abuses led the
Legislature to conclude that future dispensing opticians could
develop a proper ethical foundation for their professional
careers only by working und er the direction of licensed dispensing opticians. We do not believe that the Legislature
could reasonably have concluded that training as a dispensing
optician acquired in a physician's office, in a college, university, or other educational institution, in the armed services,
or in another state not requiring a license of persons dispensing optical goods, would tend to perpetuate the ethical
abuses that have prevailed in this profession , and that such
training acquired as an apprentice in a lic ensed dispensing
establishment, or experience acquired by virtue of having been
licensed in another state, would lead to th e elimination of
these abuses. There is a complete absence of any relationship
between the experience requirements sought to be imposed
and the legislative effort to correct ethical abuses in the profession. The L egislature has taken direct action against these
abuses and may take such further action as it deems necessary,
but it cannot r easonably be con tended that the legislation in
question bea rs any relation to these problems.
[7] Propon ents of sec tion 2552, subdivision (a) also cont en d that the Legislature might reasonably have concluded
that experience obtained under the tut elage of a licensed
uispensing optician or experience as a licensed dispensing
optician in a'nother state is reasonably necessary to insure
the expertise r equired for the practice of this specialized prof ession. Subdivision (a), however, requires no particular
course of training anu imp oses 110 stn nelarus for judging the
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licensing of other states. Thus, olle who spends five years as
an apprentice in a licensed estahlishment, 0[" as a licensee of
another state, no matter how nan-owly limited his actual
exp erience and capacity, is conclusively presumed to be more
qualified than persons like petitioner, who have had mallY
years of experience in dispensing and related fields but are
given no opportunity to demonstrate their qualificat ions. Those
who have had many years of broad experiellee in the armed
services, in other states or foreign countries, or in the employ
of a licensed eye physician, are prohibited from the practice
of their chosen occupation, not because they are incompetent
or unethical, but merely because they have not served the
required term of apprenticeship or had the good fortune to
work in another state that requires a license. Such arbitrary
restrictions upon the right to work are not defensible. (Cf.
James v. Mmoinship COl·p., 25 Cal.2d 721, 731 [155 P.2d 329,
160 A.L.R. 900].) [8] The conclusion is inescapable that the
experience necessary to qualify a person to dispense optical
goods, whatever level of expertise is demanded, is obtainable
in a variety of 'Ways. By prescribing that such experience may
be obtained in only two ways, neither of which may r easonably be thought to be sup erior to others, subdivision (a) contravenes the constitutional requirement that regruatory legislation avoid arbitrary and unreasonable classifications.
[9] The conclusion that section 2552, subdivision (a) is
invalid is reinforced by other considerations. It confers upon
presently licensed dispcnsing opticians the unlimited and
unguided power to exclude from their profession any or all
persons. [10] ""\Yhile the delegation of governmental
authority to an administrative body is proper in some instances, the delegation of absolutc legislative discretion is not.
To avoid such a result it is ne cessary that a delegating statute
establish an ascertainable standard to guide the administrative body. Here the statute assumes to l!onfer legislatiye
authority upon those who are direc tly intere;;ted in the op<.'ration of the regulatory rule and its penal provisions with no
guide for the exercise of the del<.'gaterl authority. " (State
Board of Dry Cl eanefs v. Tlmft-D-Lux Cleaners, Inc ., 40 Cal.
2d 436, 448 [254 P.2d 29] .) The minority in the Thrift-D-LlIx
case would have sw;tained the questioned statute because it
conferred power upon, an administrative agency, some of whose
members were to be appointed from the dry-cleaning industry,
rather than upon private members of the industry at large.
SubdivisioL. (a), however, delegates exclusionary power to
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private members of the intlu'i try. Furtherlllore, ill the ThriJtD-Lux ease the statute provided some standards, held to be
inadequate by the majority and thought by the minority to
he sufficient. Subdivision (a) contains no guidan ce whatev er
for the private persons to whom power is delegated .
[11] The absence of such standanls, or safeguards (see
1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, § 2.15, pp. 148-151),
renders effective review of the l'xr l'l:ise of the delegated power
impossible. If section 2552, subdivision (a) is sustained,
persons excluded from the o(;cupation of optical dispensing
because of the refusal or licensed opticians to employ them for
the five-year period, no matt er what the reason for such refusal might be, will have no remedy, for licensed opticians
are under no duty to employ anyone, for five years or for any
other period. :Moreoyer, presently licensed dispensing opticians will be given virtually absolute economic control over
those employees who are required to serve under them in order
to attain future professional objectives. [12] Delegated
power must be accompanied by suitable safeguards to guide
its use and to protect against its misuse. (A. L. A. Schecter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 537-538 [55
S.Ct. 837,79 L.Ed. 1570, 97 A.L.R. 947] ; Jersey Maid Milk
Products Co. v. Brock, 13 Ca1.2d 620, 641-642 [91 P.2d 577] ;
People v. Monterey Fish Products Co., 195 Cal. 548, 558-559
[234 P. 398, 38 A.L.R. 1186]; see 1 Davis, Administrative
Law Treatise, § 2.15, pp. 148-151.)
Other jurisdictions have invalidated similar legislation.
(Smith v. Texas, 233 U. S. 630, 638 [34 S.Ct. 681, 58 L.Ed.
1129, L.R.A. 1915D 677] [requiring freight conductors to
have had experience as brakemen] ; Schroeder v. Binks, 415
Ill. 192 [113 N.E.2d 169, 172-173] [requiring an apprenticeship to secure a license as a master plumber] ; People v. Brown,
407 Ill. 565 [95 N.E.2d 88'S, 893-899] [requiring an apprenticeship to secure a license as a master plumber] ; People v.
Ringe, 197 N.Y. 143 [90 N.E. 451, 454, 18 Ann.Cas. 474, 27
L .R.A . N.S . 528] [requiring an apprenticeship to secure a
license as an undertaker ] ; City of Sioux Falls v. Kadinger,
73 S.D. 217 [50 N.W.2d 797, 799-S00] [requ iring an apprenticeship to secure a license as a ma<;ter plumber] ; Hollinas'll'()rth Y. State Board of Barber Examincrs . 217 Ind. 373 [28
N .E.2d 64, 67 ] [permitting 80 per cent of licensed barbers to
fix minimum prices and opellill':!' <\111.1 d o~,illg hours] ; Fink v.
Cole, 302 N.Y. 216 [97 N.B2d S73. 8761 rd :>ll'gating to private
jockey clubs power to license hon;e owners, trainers, and
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jO<.:kcys ] ; sec olher caSl's dis, ussl'll in 1 Davis, Admini:-;j rativc
Law Treat ise', § 2.14, pp. 138-147. ) D efcmlant would distinguish these cases 011 the g rounu that they diu not involve the
h ealing arts. [13] When, as here, however, a statute dis~l'illlilJates uet\Ye en membe rs of different classes, and the disc,'imination has no reasonabl e relation to the puhlic hcalth,
safety and welfare, it must raIl \-vhether it im'olvcs th e healillg
arts or a ny other activity.
Defendant invokes Ex pad e Whitl ey, 144 CaL 167 [77 P.
879, 1 Ann.Cas. 13 ], upllOluing a statute requiring certain
kinds of exp eri ence for a license as a dentist. The statu te,
however , provided three methods of acquiring the r equisite
experience, and the court !lel,1 oilly that experience or training
was a permissibl e standard for determining the competency
of an applicant for aumission to the practice of dentistry. The
case does not stanu for the proposition that the Legislature
may discriminate ar bi trar ii:,; be tween pcrsons with the same
experience because they have received it under conditions differing only in r espeds not r ele vant to their qualifications.
Proponents of section 2562, subuivision (a) cite other cases
upholdillg restrictions upon t he pradice of the h ealing arts
based upon experience or training. None of these cases purport
to foreclose invalidation of regulatory statutes that establish
palpably unreasonable classifications. bdeed, at least one of
the cases relied upon by the proponents of subdivision (a)
expressly leaves open the possibility of invalidation of more
arbitrary regulations. (P eople ex rd. Chicago D e.ntal Society
v. A..A..A. D en tal Laboratories, Inc., 8 Ill.2d 330 [134 N.E.2d
285, 289-290].) Others involved statutes quite different from
subdivision (a) that app ear to be eminently r easonable.
(Mann v. Board of M edical E.raminers, 31 Cal.:2d 30, 41-42
[187 P.2d 1] ; In re R1lst, 181 Cal. 73, 81 [183 P. 548] ; People
v. Ratledg e, 172 Cal. 401, 40 3, 406 [156 P . 465] ; Arwine v.
Board of M edical E xamill er s, 151 Cal. 499, 504 [91 P . 319] ;
People ex reI. Stepski v. Harford, 286 N.Y. 477,484-485 [36
N.E .2d 670] ; NOl'lcood v. Parentea u, 75 S .D. 303, 311-312
[63 N.W.2d 807].)
[14] The invalidity of subdivision (a) of Hection 2552
llot'S not affect the proyisions or suuc1iyision (b), \\'hich relluires applicants to present affidavits establishing experience,
good mor,:al character, and competence. The L egislature may
require applicants for licenses as dispensing opticians to demonstrate that they have these qnalities. (See Gospel Army v.
City of Los Angeles, 27 Cal.2cl 232, 248 [163 P.2d 704] ; Ex
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parle Whitley, S1lpra, pp. 177-178; People ex reI. Chiwgo
Dental Society v. A.A.A. Dental Laboratories, Inc., supra,
p. 290.) The 1939 enactmcnt regarding dispensing opti<:ialls
contained a lengthy severability clause. Section 24 of the
Business and Professions Code also proviJes that "If any
provision of this code, or the application thereof, to any
person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the
code, or the application of such provision to other persons or
circumstances, shall not be affected thereby." [15] The
test of severability is whether the invalid parts of the statute
can be severed from the otherwise valid parts without destroying the statutory scheme, or the utility of the remaining provisions. (Forster Shipbldg. Co. v. County of Los Angeles,
54 Cal.2d 450, 457 [6 Cal.Rptr. 24, 353 P .2d 736J ; P eople v.
McCaughan,49 Ca1.2d 409,416 [317 P.2d 974J.) The invalidity of subdivision (a) in no way affects subdivision (b). Independent parts of amendments, as well as independent parts
of original enactments, are severable.
Similarly, those parts of subdivision ' (a) that are not invalid in themselves are not affected by the only invalid
requirement in subdivision (a), namely that experience be
obtained " . . . in an establishment or establishments of a
dispensing optician registered under this chapter or of a dispensing optician engaged in dispensing prior to the enactment
of this chapter and thereafter registered, or who has been
licensed as a dispensing optician for a period of five years in
another state. " Thus, the provisions of subdivision (a) defining the persons of whom experience is required and specifying the amount of experience necessary for registration are
valid. Those parts of the subdivision serve a purpose independent of the purpose for which the invalid apprenticeship requirement was included, and can function independently of it. They are therefore severable from the invalid part
of the subdivision. (Forst er Shipbldg. Co. v. Comity of Los
Angeles, supra; People v. McCaughan, supra.)
The alternative ground upon \\"hich the board r ~ lied in d enying petitioner 's applica tion for a license \\·as that he failed to
establish good moral character. The basis for this finding was
that petitioner had dispensed optical goods without a license.
When petitioner violated the statute, however, the board
had already denied his application because he had not met the
requirements of section 2552, subdivision (a). [16] Although failure to copform to an unconstitutional regulation
might under some circumstances bc evidence of bad character,
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it is not here, where petitioner did not violate the statute
until denial of his application for failure to satisfy the very
condition that renders the regulation invalid and where the
violations indicate no continued intention to disregard the
law but rather an effort to establish its invalidity.
[17] The board contends that petitioner testified falsely
regarding the second instance of dispellsing without a license.
The record establishes, however, that petitioner was, at most,
confused as to the meaning of "dispensing" under the statute.
His testimony does not appear to have been intentionally false.
It is also suggested that petitioner is precluded by his guilty
plea in the previous criminal action from attacking the constitutionality of section 2552, subdivision (a). [ 18 ] A
conviction for violation of an unconstitutional statute, however, may be attacked collaterally. (In 1'e Dix on, 41 Ca1.2d
756, 762 [264 P.2d 513] ; In re B ell, 19 Ca1.2d 488, 492-495
[122 P.2d 22].)
[19] Petitioner has proved that he has met the requirement of five years' experience in optical dispensing. He has
furnished the requisite affidavits attesting to his good moral
character. He is therefore entitled to be licensed as a dispensing optician.
The judgment is reversed and the case remanded to the
trial court with directions to issue the writ ordering the Board
of Medical Examiners to register petitioner as a dispensing
optician.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., White, J.,
and Dooling, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied February
14,1962.

